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I. Introduction
1 It  is  now  widely  accepted  that,  historically,  ‘order  maintenance’  rather  than  crime
prevention  has  constituted  the  ‘core  mandate’  of  modern  policing3.  Historians  have
highlighted the manner  in which the police  responded to  this  imperative  in diverse
political contexts, both metropolitan and colonial, during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries4.  This  essay  focuses  on  urban  policing  in  colonial  Bombay  during  the  late
Victorian and Edwardian eras, a period when the port town was transformed into a major
industrial  metropolis.  The  outbreak  of  large-scale  urban  riots  during  the  1890s,  in
conjunction with the rapid growth of an unregulated proletarian ‘secondary economy’
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and public culture centred on the street, rendered Bombay’s colonial rulers increasingly
apprehensive about the threat  posed to ‘public order’  by industrial  urbanization and
massive labour migration. The essay examines how the anxieties provoked by a swiftly
changing urban environment prompted a reappraisal of colonial policing strategies and
assesses the consequences of their responses for the maintenance of public order.
2 In recent years, studies of the colonial police in British India have underscored its relative
weaknesses as an instrument of social control5.  Accounts of colonial policing in rural
India, for instance, have noted that ‘the growth of the police was continually handicapped
by the financial considerations of Imperial rule’. Consequently, ‘their numbers and reach
were limited’ and forced them to rely on ‘local allies who were also the local controllers’6.
Similar constraints have also been highlighted by studies of urban policing under the Raj7
.  A recent account of ‘everyday policing’ in colonial Bombay has noted that the ‘daily
operations of the police were determined by the financial and political constraints within
which they developed’. Furthermore, the police ‘operated less as simply an instrument of
social  control,  but  proved  more  responsive  to  influences  which  were  relatively
autonomous of their own internal structure of command’ and hence could not ‘fulfil their
disciplinary, even coercive, function systematically’. At the same time, ‘at lesser levels,
albeit  less  systematically,  the  working classes  too could draw upon,  appropriate  and
deploy their personal and social caste and kinship connections with the police’8.  This
perspective has served as a useful corrective to institutional approaches that tended to
portray the colonial police as a ‘monolithic’ instrument of coercion, which was external
to local society9. Yet the analytical pendulum has now swung to the other extreme. Thus,
if  earlier  studies  of  the colonial  police  perceived it  as  emblematic  of  an omnipotent
colonial state, the revisionist view emphasises the ‘fragility of its control’. In the process,
some accounts within the revisionist framework are inclined to overstate the weaknesses
of the colonial police and the extent to which it became ‘imprisoned’ within the confines
of  local  networks  of  power  in  particular  urban  contexts10.  Further,  in  highlighting
processes of mutual accommodation and reciprocity, there is a tendency to play down the
conflictual logic that governed the relationship between the colonial police and the urban
working classes. However, as a recent social history of North Indian towns in the late
colonial period has shown, while a lack of numbers precluded ‘intensive policing on a
regular basis’, everyday relations between the colonial police and the poor were marked
by persistent antagonism and friction11.
3 This essay seeks to argue that the institutional weaknesses that impelled the police to
expand its network of local allies in turn of the century Bombay were offset by a widening
of its regulatory and coercive powers vis-à-vis a range of sites and activities within an
emergent ‘proletarian public sphere’. In particular, the essay highlights the significance
of  a new  police  act,  introduced  in  1902,  which  rendered  the  police  an  increasingly
obtrusive presence in the social relations of the street and the urban neighbourhood. The
wide discretionary powers granted to the police by the new act, in a context where its
very institutional limitations precluded a comprehensive and consistent enforcement of
the law, served especially to amplify the scale and dimensions of the potential friction
between the police and the urban poor in the years leading up to the First World War.
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II. Fin de siècle Bombay: A ‘Crisis’ of Urban Order
4 By the last decade of the nineteenth century, colonial Bombay had experienced a century
of sustained growth that had transformed it from a pestilential, swamp-ridden port town
into a city that vied with Calcutta for the title of urbs prima in Indis. It was not only an
important commercial and financial junction between a vast regional hinterland and the
capitalist world economy, but also the locus of a major cotton-textile industry that was
founded and dominated by Indian entrepreneurship. The rapid extension of the cotton
mills from the 1870s onwards, in particular, had a major impact on the urban economy.
Alongside  the  textile  factories  sprang  up  a  range  of  ancillary  small  industries  and
workshops that sought to cater to its needs. Many small workshops serviced the cotton
mills  by  undertaking  maintenance  and  repair  of  machinery,  while  there  were  other
economic activities, such as the retail sector of the cloth market including tailoring and
dressmaking, whose fortunes were vitally affected by the textile industry12. At the same
time, the last quarter of the nineteenth century also witnessed the emergence of several
other types of industrial activity. In particular, there was a proliferation in the number of
small-scale manufacturing enterprises catering to the varied demands of a burgeoning
metropolis13.
5 Bombay’s  rapid  industrial  growth during  the  late  nineteenth  century  drew an ever-
increasing number of rural migrants to the city. Initially, a significant proportion of these
migrants were drawn from its immediate hinterland within the Bombay Presidency14.
Their ranks were reinforced by streams of migration from north India, which commenced
in the 1880s and then accelerated in the early twentieth century15. A majority of these
migrants were employed on a casual basis in the cotton-textile industry as well as the
small manufacturing units and workshops that evaded the regulations of the Factory Act
16. There were also general labouring jobs to be found in the docks, the building trade, the
cotton godowns, markets and warehouses, the various retail trades as well as the various
public agencies such as the railways, tramways and the municipality17.
6 Despite the quickening pace of industrial development and the growing influx of rural
migrants, the city’s British rulers did not experience any major threat to ‘public order’
prior to the last  decade of  the nineteenth century.  As one historian has noted,  such
incidents of group violence as had occurred in the city before the 1890s were largely
small-scale,  confined  to  the  ‘internal  social  world’  of  the  neighbourhood  and  the
participants who were involved in them ‘operated within a reasonably narrow territorial
space’. Thus, instances of group violence had posed no real danger to urban order in the
city at large and ‘the bulk of the evidence suggests for Bombay urban society considerable
insularity and a disjunction from the Imperial presence’18.
7 During the 1890s, however, the city’s ruling authorities were confronted with two major
urban riots that were not only unprecedented in the scale and intensity of the violence
but also in terms of their wider political implications. The first of these occurred on 11
August 1893, when a sectarian affray between some Hindus and Muslims in the vicinity of
the Jama Masjid escalated into a full-blown conflagration that engulfed large parts of the
city. According to official estimates, eighty people were killed and five hundred and thirty
wounded in the violence that accompanied the riots19. Over fifteen hundred arrests on
grounds of ‘unlawful assembly’ were made before the riots were finally suppressed. The
three days of rioting, the Bombay Gazette declared, had been ‘made memorable in local
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history by the destruction of temples and of mosques, and the looting of shops, to the
accompaniment of fierce faction fights in the streets, varied with senseless assaults on
the police and the military’. There were no instances in the history of the city over the
past half century, it added, ‘of more serious riots, considering the area over which they
extended and the enormous numbers of people who took part in them’20.
8 The other major riot of the decade occurred at the height of the colonial state’s frenzied
attempts to suppress a major plague epidemic that broke out in the city during the late
1890s. On 9 March 1898, a search party looking for concealed plague victims in the Julaha
(community of Muslim weavers from North India) moholla (neighbourhood) in Madanpura
(a Muslim-dominated locality in the Indian part of the city) attempted to remove a young
girl  who  had supposedly  contracted  the  disease.  The  search  party  encountered  stiff
resistance and soon the police were called into quell  the tumult.  The decision of  an
official present at the spot to open fire on the crowd of protesting weavers rapidly turned
the affray into a riot that once again engulfed the Indian town21.The protestors were
joined by a large number of Maratha mill workers who were roaming about the streets in
the  aftermath  of  the  Holi  (the  Hindu  spring  festival  in  which  participants  sprinkle
coloured powder on one another) revelry22.The rampaging crowds proceeded to attack
the local jail and fire station23. In other places, Europeans were set upon by angry mobs24.
9 The riots of 1893 and the popular protest against the plague measures rendered colonial
authorities increasingly anxious about their ability to prevent conflicts from breaching
the bounds of the neighbourhood and engulfing the city at large. One source of concern
for the city’s rulers stemmed from the widespread participation in the riots of the city’s
largely  Marathi-speaking industrial  workforce  massed together  in  the  vicinity of  the
textile mills on the northern outskirts of the city25.‘They live mostly together in large
chawls beyond the city proper, where the Police is weakest’, noted a police report barely
a month after the August riots,  ‘and in case they should resort to violence in lieu of
argument  the  danger  to  the  public  peace  will  be  very  serious’26.  The  riots  had  also
occurred at a time when the city’s textile industry experienced what one contemporary
described as a prolonged ‘strike mania’, with workers in many individual mills striking
work over wage reductions27.As the official historian of the city police noted, these strikes
were the first ‘of any magnitude that occurred in the industrial area’ and necessitated the
posting of police parties in the mill districts ‘in order to guard mill property and quell
possible  disorder’28.Following  these  strikes,  colonial  authorities  grew  increasingly
concerned about the threat that disruption of work in the cotton mills posed to urban law
and order and responded readily to requests for assistance from employers of labour29.
10 The sectarian character of the 1893 riots also evoked fears about the increasing number
of  migrants  from  northern  India,  supposedly  imbued  with  a  primordial  religious
fanaticism that rendered them a ‘dangerous’ element within the city30.In the future, the
civil  servant  James  Campbell  warned,  the  influx  of  North Indians,  ‘the  thousands  of
Pathans, Afghans, Sidis, Arabs and Persians, all fighting men and many of them reckless’,
was likely to cause problems for urban authorities31.  Interestingly,  Campbell  presided
over the Bombay Plague Committee in March 1898 when the resistance of the Julaha
weavers to the plague search party ignited the riot in Madanpura. In his account of the
riot, Campbell was quick to remind the government that the Julahas, ‘have for years been
known to be excitable and somewhat disaffected’, and that they were ‘the most dangerous
classes of rioters in 1893’32.
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11 The participation of the poor in the urban riots was not the only source of anxiety for
Bombay’s ruling authorities during the 1890s. An equally significant cause for concern
was an emergent proletarian casual economy and public culture centred on the street.
The presence of a large working-class population in the city, a major proportion of which
was employed on a casual basis, was accompanied by the rapid expansion of a ‘secondary
economy  of  the  street’  geared  towards  servicing  its  material  needs.  This  secondary
economy of the working classes was not only a source of employment, housing, credit and
the necessities of daily life, but also catered to the sexual needs of predominantly male
migrants who had left their families behind in the village. It was, as in other large cities of
the time, a largely unregulated domain characterised by ‘low costs, low overheads, and
irregular hours of provision’, and encompassed ‘the street hawker, the street market, the
pawnshop, the fence’ as well as cheap hotels, liquor shops, lodging houses and brothels33.
Significantly, the rhythms of the secondary economy in Bombay were crucially shaped by
the strategies of capital, which ‘engendered a fluctuating demand for labour, hastening
its turnover and instability, and committed and exposed a large number of job seekers
involuntarily to the uncertainties of the casual labour market’34.
12 Simultaneously, this secondary economy was paralleled by the rise of a proletarian public
culture based on patterns of informal association and sociability centred on the street35.
In  part,  this  development  was  an  outcome  of  the  housing  shortages  and  massive
overcrowding that forced a majority of the urban poor to live on the city’s footpaths36.
But, as Chandavarkar has pointed out, ‘The importance of the street did not derive simply
from the fact that men lived on it’.  Rather, the street was also the principal locus of
working class social life and recreational activities, ranging from the plebeian akharas
(gymnasia)  and  tamashas (street  theatre)  to  the  liquor  shops  where  many  workers
congregated after work37.
13 For colonial authorities this proletarian casual economy and culture centred on the street
came to represent a potential threat to public order on account of the widely entrenched
perception that it was a characterized by a culture of ‘roughness’. As has been noted by
historians in recent times, colonial discourse frequently attributed an innate lawlessness
and violence to the working classes on account of ‘their rural origins, their status as
casual  labour  and  their  incomplete  adaptation  to  the  industrial  setting’38.  Many
contemporary observers in Bombay, for instance, attributed the looting and destruction
that  accompanied the riots  of  the 1890s  to  the activities  of  unemployed and violent
budmashes (criminals) that loafed about the streets39. Similarly, places where the urban
poor  gravitated  after  work,  especially  liquor  shops,  brothels,  akharas  and  talims
(gymnasia), came to be seen as sites of latent disorderliness and violence40.
14 By the last decade of the nineteenth century colonial authorities also began to register a
growing concern about the conduct of the annual Muslim festival of Muharram. The ten-
day long festival, recalling the martyrdom of Husain at Kerbala, was one of mourning for
Bombay’s Shi’as(one of the two principal sects within Islam). But it was the carnivalesque
Sunni (the other major sect within Islam) mode of celebration, centering on the parading
of large wooden models of the mausoleum of Hussain at Karbala, known as ta’ziyas or
tabuts, and accompanied by wandering tolis (street gangs) that was more prominent in the
city during the late nineteenth century41. Each street or neighbourhood had its own toli,
largely  comprising  of  youths  drawn  from the  labouring  classes  irrespective  of  their
religious  affiliation42.  The  size  of  the  tolis  varied  depending  on  the  affluence  of  the
neighbourhood and the fund-raising abilities of  its leaders43.  The clowns,  mimics and
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acrobats that accompanied the tolis accentual the carnivalesque character of the festival,
‘the like of which for extent and eccentricity, is to be found in few other cities in the
world’44. The Muharram festivities had been relatively free of violence for the better part
of the nineteenth century, but during the 1890s an intensification of inter-neighbourhood
competition and rivalry as well as the growing size of the street gangs ‘raised the specter
of a threat to general stability’ in the official mind45.
15 Urban street life also became the focus of colonial anxieties for other reasons during the
late 1890s. Fears began to be entertained about the presence of officially defined ‘criminal
classes’ and ‘criminal tribes’ that supposedly infested the city’s streets46. Bombay was said
to be ‘well represented in the matter of members belonging to the criminal classes and
foreigners’ since it was ‘a haven of refuge and an emporium of labour for such people’47.
Moreover, as famine and then epidemic diseases ravaged many rural districts of western
India  during  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century,  colonial  officials  also  grew
alarmed about the influx of ‘beggars’, ‘vagrants’ and ‘pauper immigrants’ who were
perceived to be repositories of disease and imbued with criminal tendencies48. Indeed,
T.S. Weir, the city’s Health Officer, was convinced that, ‘the criminal, the destitute, the
diseased in every land of India, in easy communication with Bombay, even as distant as
Upper India, trudge here in the hope of an easy sustenance’49. A view endorsed by the
police commissioner who noted that such people were ‘as a rule extremely filthy in their
habits’, ‘afflicted with loathsome deformities’ and repositories of ‘infectious diseases’50. In
the context of the anxieties aroused by the plague epidemic, colonial officials increasingly
favoured summarily deporting such ‘destitute immigrants’ from the city51.
 
III. A ‘Limited Raj’?
16 The  tensions  of  the  1890s  rendered  Bombay’s  rulers  increasingly  anxious  about  the
preservation of ‘public order’ in a rapidly changing urban environment. One response of
the colonial authorities in such circumstances was to effect changes aimed at buttressing
the numerical strength of the police and improving their discipline in order to render
them a more reliable tool of social control. Originating as an armed local militia in the
late eighteenth century,  Bombay’s police force acquired its modern form in the mid-
nineteenth century52.  Police organization in the city,  headed by a commissioner,  was
modelled loosely along the lines of the London Metropolitan Police. But for the better
part  of  the late nineteenth century,  the force was ‘half  the strength of  Calcutta and
considerably weaker than London’53. Moreover, the long hours of work and the low rates
of pay combined to act as a strong deterrent when it came to recruitment into the police
force among the local population54. Indeed, desertions from the lower ranks of the force
were a common occurrence during times of buoyancy in the urban economy.
17 From the 1890s onwards the issue of police reorganization, especially the augmentation
of its numerical strength, began to attract sustained official attention. Thus, while there
had been a decrease in the size of the force during the two decades between 1865 and
188555,  numbers  almost  doubled  in  the  last  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century56.  In
particular, the armed mounted police was trebled in the wake of the 1893 riots in order to
provide a reserve force during future emergencies. Piecemeal increments to the size of
the force were introduced during the following decade too, usually prompted by major
episodes of urban rioting. Misgivings about the efficiency and reliability of the Bombay
police, highlighted by the findings of the Police Commission of 1902-03, also directed
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attention to the vexed question of organizational reforms. In 1908, following a series of
riots, the provincial government appointed a committee to investigate the functioning of
the city’s police force. The Morison committee noted in its report that Bombay not only
lacked adequately equipped police stations, but that the apparatus for the investigation of
crime at the divisional level was also ineffectual. It also pointed out that the systems of
control that were in place were inefficient because of ‘an absence of educated men in the
ranks of the native constables and jemadars’,  as well as the inability of the European
officers  to exercise proper supervision since they did not  ‘know the language of  the
people of the City as well as they ought to’. No increase in the numerical strength of the
police, the Committee argued, would be of any use ‘unless the control from above is made
much more efficient from the top downwards’57.
18 S.M. Edwardes, a member of the committee who subsequently became the city’s police
commissioner,  was entrusted with the task of  devising a  reorganization scheme that
would remedy these institutional defects. Edwardes proposed a number of reforms, the
most significant involving the introduction of modern methods of crime registration in
newly  designed  police  stations  manned  by  a  superior  and  subordinate  investigating
agency58.He also advocated replacing the old fixed point system of crime investigation
with a new system based on regular patrolling of the streets. His scheme entailed a total
increase of 1,639 policemen to the force in order to make the system practicable and
would have ensured ‘a proportion roughly of one policeman to every 247 of population’59.
However,  as  historians  have  noted,  financial  constraints  consistently  precluded  any
major attempt at  police reorganization and reform60.  Inevitably,  Edwardes’  ambitious
proposals were whittled down under official strictures on the need for ‘economy’ and a
subsequent  reorganization scheme mooted in 1918 found the commissioner of  police
rehearsing the familiar litany of woes: there was a ‘greater strain’ on the urban police on
account of the ‘increased work thrown on the force as a direct result of the shortage of
men’; the force was accepting ‘recruits of lower physical standard in order to cope with
vacancies’, the men were underfed ‘owing to dearness of all commodities’, and a majority
of the policemen lived in insanitary housing since they were ‘still unprovided with lines’61
.
19 Alongside the piecemeal attempts at police reorganization and reform, the upheavals of
the 1890s also forced colonial authorities to reassess their relationship with the urban
neighbourhoods. Prior to the last decade of the nineteenth century, colonial authorities
had by and large tended to stay aloof from the affairs of the neighbourhood. ‘For much of
the time’, Ian Catanach has noted, ‘the nineteenth century British did not normally see
control of the Indian Town as a problem of great consequence’62. Formal authority within
the urban neighbourhoods had generally  been exercised by legitimated structures  of
ostensibly ‘traditional’ corporate authority, most notably, caste and community headmen
63. Yet until the beginning of the 1890s the colonial administration had maintained only
the most ‘tenuous and haphazard’ links with these ‘traditional’ sources of authority64.
20 However, the turbulence of the 1890s prompted the city’s ruling authorities to cultivate
closer links with those who could be identified as ‘leaders’ within the localities. Thus,
during the plague campaign of the late 1890s an attempt was made to work through the
‘natural leaders’ of the local communities in the prosecution of plague policies65. Yet, as
the decade wore on, it also became apparent to colonial officials that the large influx of
new migrants  into the city had wrought a  significant  change in the power relations
within the neighbourhoods. Power and influence no longer resided solely in the formal,
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legitimated  sources  of  corporate  authority  within  the  neighbourhood,  but  was
increasingly exercised by those who controlled the informal networks of patronage that
had begun to coalesce within the proletarian secondary economy and culture of the street
during  the  late  nineteenth  century.  These  included  jobbers,  rent-collectors,  petty
landlords,  Pathan  moneylenders,  the  proprietors  of  taverns  and  tea-shops,  brothels,
gymnasiums and street-bosses of various kinds commonly known as dadas66.
21 Consequently,  while  the  traditionally  legitimated  structures  of  corporate  authority
continued to be utilised, the colonial administration sought increasingly to forge links
with some of these new sources of influence. ‘When there are possibilities of disturbance
in Bombay’, revealed S.M. Edwardes, ‘the Commissioner of Police calls in to his assistance
a class of persons who cannot be called leading citizens, who are often uneducated, who
are ordinarily never heard of, and who themselves live in the quarters where the trouble
is fomented.’ ‘Disorder of a violent kind’, he argued, ‘is not created as a rule by members
of the Municipal Corporation; but by the members of a lower stratum, which is rarely
seen in society, is largely uneducated, but which controls the bazaar’67. At the same time,
while the upheavals of the 1890s prompted colonial authorities to shore up their ties with
the world of the neighbourhood, a reliance on sources of informal influence was in itself
not a sufficient guarantee against disruptions of public order. Indeed, colonial authorities
‘often tried to invest those they perceived as neighbourhood leaders with power and
influence which they never possessed’ and this strategy for the maintenance of public
order was ‘founded upon shifting sands’68.
 
IV. A new interventionism: the 1902 City Police Act
22 Latent anxieties about the reliability of their local networks in the neighbourhood, as well
as the perception that a rapidly burgeoning city like Bombay had ‘special’ requirements,
prompted colonial authorities to cast about for other means of securing public order. In a
context in which the influence of the traditional neighbourhood leaders were perceived
to have been eroded and the newly emerging informal networks of patronage based on
the street were not considered entirely reliable,  colonial  authorities sought to fortify
themselves with new, more authoritarian methods of control ‘from above’. Most notably,
in July 1902 a new piece of legislation was introduced which extended police jurisdiction
over  a  range  of  activities  and  sites  that  had  hitherto  been  outside  its  purview and
concentrated enormous discretionary powers in the hands of the commissioner and his
deputies69.
23 The nature and scope of the provisions that were introduced by the new act for the
‘preservation of order’ suggest that the developments of the 1890s had registered a
significant impact on the official mind. First, the act vested the police with an exhaustive
array of ‘special powers’ for regulating and controlling all collective activities in public
spaces that might potentially compromise the ‘public peace’. Thus, police officials could
now ‘direct the conduct of, and behavior or action of persons constituting, processions
and assemblies in streets’; ‘prescribe the routes by which and the times at which any such
processions  may,  or  may  not  pass’;  ‘prevent  obstructions  on  the  occasion  of  all
processions and assemblies and in the neighbourhood of all  places of worship’;  ‘keep
order on and in all streets, quays, wharves, landing-places and all other public places or
places of public resort’; and ‘regulate and control music or singing in any street or public
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place, and the beating of drums, tom-toms and other instruments and the blowing or
sounding of horns or other noisy instruments, in or near any street or public place’70.
24 Second, the new act also consolidated and extended the formal powers of regulation and
control vested in the police by criminalizing a range of activities in ‘public’ sites and
spaces.  In some instances,  pre-existing punitive provisions against some categories of
offences were rendered even more stringent than before. Especially noteworthy in this
regard were the provisions with regard to ‘pauper immigrants’ and ‘beggars’. Those who
were arrested under either of these categories now faced a maximum punishment of a
one-month prison sentence or  a  fifty-rupee fine71.The Act  also enabled the police  to
deport ‘pauper immigrants’ and persons convicted twice of begging. Any such deported
persons who returned to Bombay without the permission of the police could be jailed for
up to two years.
25 Furthermore, the very definition of ‘public’ sites and spaces that were subject to police
regulation  was  rendered  as  comprehensive  as  possible.  For  instance,  a  ‘street’  was
construed  to  mean  ‘any  road,  footway,  square,  court,  alley  or  passage,  whether  a
thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a permanently or temporarily a right of
access’.  Similarly,  a  place  of  ‘public  entertainment’  included  any  ‘refreshment-room,
eating house, coffee-house, liquor-house, boarding-house, lodging-house, hotel, tavern or
wine, beer, spirit, arrack, toddy, ganja, bhang or opium shop’. Likewise, a place of ‘public
amusement’ encompassed ‘any place, enclosure, building, tent, booth or other erection,
whether permanent or temporary, where music,  singing, dancing or any diversion or
game… is provided’, and included any ‘race-course, circus, theatre, music hall, billiard-
room, bagatelle-room, gymnasium or fencing school’72.
26 Significantly,  the  new  police  act  vested  a  range  of  discretionary  powers  in  the
commissioner  of  police  and  his  subordinates.  The  most  significant  of  these  were  in
relation  to  the  newly  framed  ‘special  orders’  for  the  ‘preservation  of  public  order’.
Whereas prior to the introduction of the 1902 act the police commissioner could only
issue  general  rules  for  the  conduct  of  public  assemblies  and  processions,  the  newly
introduced  legislation  vested  him with  a  detailed  and  exhaustive  list  of  powers.  No
collective activity or display in public was now possible without the prior permission of
the police. If  the police commissioner considered it expedient, he could prohibit ‘any
assembly or procession whenever and for so long as he considers such prohibition to be
necessary for the preservation of the public peace or public safety’73. The commissioner of
police was also empowered to prohibit, whenever he deemed fit, ‘the carrying of swords,
spears,  bludgeons,  guns,  or other offensive weapons,  in any public place’,  ‘the public
utterance of cries, singing of songs, playing of music’ and ‘the delivery of harangues, the
use  of  gestures  or  mimetic  representations,  and  the  preparation,  exhibition  or
dissemination of pictures, symbols, placards, or of any other object or thing’ that in his
view was likely to ‘inflame religious animosity or hostility between different classes, or
incite to a commission of an offence, to a disturbance of the public peace or to resistance
to or contempt of the law’74. If he was satisfied that in an ‘actual or intended religious or
ceremonial or corporate display or exhibition or organized assemblage in any street or
public place’ there was the likelihood of a ‘grave disturbance of the peace’, the police
commissioner could ‘give such orders as to the conduct of the persons concerned towards
each  other  and  towards  the  public’  as  he  thought  necessary75.  Moreover,  the  police
commissioner had the power to direct those whose movements he suspected of causing
‘danger or alarm’ or manifesting ‘unlawful designs’, to ‘disperse and remove themselves’
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to any place within or outside the city that he might designate76. Refusal to do so could
result in their forcible deportation from the city by the police.
27 The powers of the police commissioner were also augmented in other ways. In particular,
the new act vested the commissioner with wide discretionary powers with regard to the
licensing of all commercial activities that were carried on in spaces designated as ‘public’.
Prior to the introduction of the act, the commissioner of police was bound by the law to
issue  a  license  to  anyone applying for  one.  Now,  however,  he  could refuse  to  grant
licenses to those who were reckoned to possess ‘a notoriously bad character’77. In some
circumstances,  the  act  also  allowed the  police  commissioner  to  exercise  the  judicial
powers of a presidency magistrate78.
28 It  is  not  intended  to  suggest,  of  course,  that  such  capacious  formal  powers  were
automatically translated into pervasive police surveillance on the ground. Nonetheless,
the introduction of  the new police  act  was  to  have significant  consequences  for  the
relationship between the police and local society. In particular, the ‘special orders’ for the
‘preservation of order’, the discretionary powers to license activities in public spaces as
well  as  the strengthening of  the punitive powers in relation to various categories of
‘street offences’, amplified the scale and dimension of the potential conflict between the
police and the urban poor.
 
V. Policing the proletarian public sphere
29 One significant consequence of the 1902 act was that the vast discretionary powers vested
in the commissioner of police and his immediate subordinates served to entrench them in
a pivotal role within the politics of the urban neighbourhood and the street. Of course,
colonial police officials had intervened from time to time in local disputes on an informal
basis even before the passing of the 1902 act. But the police could now actively deploy the
detailed  and sweeping powers  bestowed by  the  new act  in  dealing  with  recalcitrant
elements. At the same time, those who rendered themselves useful to the police could
reap the reward for  their  services  by being granted ‘favours’  of  various  kinds,  most
notably,  with  regard  to  licenses  for  activities  that  now  required  police  permission.
Furthermore,  by  widening  the  discretionary  powers  of  the  police,  the  new  act  also
predisposed the European upper ranks of the force to act on their anxieties about the
threat to public order in an ‘oriental’ city and to intervene in local disputes in a manner
hitherto unprecedented. The corollary to this, however, was that the police became more
directly exposed and vulnerable to popular resentment on account of their actions.
30 The ‘Muharram riots’  that repeatedly  rocked the city  during the first  decade of  the
twentieth century are illustrative of some of these themes79.  During the late 1890s, as
noted  previously,  European  police  officers  had  increasingly  began  to  perceive  the
Muharram festival as a threat to public order on account of the seemingly ‘licentious’ and
‘riotous’ behavior of the lower classes who participated in the festival in large numbers80.
During the early years of the twentieth century, the powerlessness of the ‘traditional’
leaders  in  the  face  of  these  elements,  and  the  inability  of  the  police  to  adequately
manipulate the informal sources of influence within the neighbourhood, precipitated a
more  direct  application of  force  from above.  Most  notably,  the  police  commissioner
liberally  deployed  the  ‘special  powers’  bestowed  by  the  1902  act  in  an  attempt  to
underscore British authority over the city.
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31 The tensions  over  the  conduct  of  the  Moharram festival  centered largely  on Doctor
Street, a locality that had been predominantly inhabited by the Sunni lower classes until
the 1890s. The Bohras, who were of the Shi’asect, gradually began to move in to this
street  during  the  last  decade  of  the  century.  By  the  turn  of  the  century  the
neighbourhood had come to be dominated by the houses and mosques of the Bohras, a
reflection of the economic prosperity of this ‘respectable’ trading community81. It is likely
that  their  economic  and social  superiority  began to  arouse  resentment  among their
poorer neighbours, a feeling that was aggravated when the Bohras sought to assert their
authority over Doctor Street by preventing the passage of the Muharram tolis through the
locality.
32 On 23 March 1904, when a Muharram toli made its way through Doctor Street ‘playing
music as is, and has been for many years, the custom in this street’, they were set upon by
a  crowd  of  Bohras82.  This  incident  prompted  the  police  to  immediately  register  its
presence in the neighbourhood. The next night when another procession entered Doctor
Street, a police party stationed outside the Bohra mosque stopped the music, resulting in
a  minor  affray83.  Three  days  later  a  procession that  set  out from Rangari  moholla,  a
neighbourhood predominantly inhabited by Muslim labourers, was again prevented by
the police from going into Doctor Street and stoned by the Bohras living in an adjacent
street when they passed through that area. The Rangari moholla processionists retaliated
by attacking any Bohras whom they encountered on the streets. As a punitive measure,
the police commissioner cancelled the festival license of the Rangari moholla and closed
Doctor Street to all street processions for the remainder of the festival84. The decision by
the police to ban processions from passing through Doctor Street provoked widespread
resentment among the adjacent neighbourhoods85. The mood was thus sullen when the
festival ended and shortly thereafter, popular anger against the Bohras of Doctor Street
exploded  into  a  riot  in  which  the  community  was  targeted  for  attack.  Enraged
crowdsrepeatedly surged through Bohra-dominated neighbourhoods in symbolic acts of
violation of their territorial space86. Bohras were attacked on the streets and the police
were stoned at various points, prompting the police commissioner to call for military aid
in suppressing the violence87.
33 The tensions opened up by the riot of 1904 continued to simmer in the following years. In
1906, the Bohras of Doctor Street petitioned the police to use the special powers bestowed
by the 1902 act to prevent the Muharram tolis from passing through the street between
the fifth and final  night of  the festival88.  Police officials  responded favourably to the
Bohra petition and stationed a large contingent of policemen in Doctor Street during the
festival in 1907. Their actions stoked the embers of popular resentment and eventually
led to an even bigger conflagration in 1908. The riots that year were triggered by an
affray involving a Julaha procession and some Sunnis who were praying in their mosque
on  Falkland  Road  on  the  immersion  day89.  The  police  arrested  three  of  the  Sunnis
allegedly involved in the incident, the news of which spread rapidly through the city. As a
mark of protest many of the tolis refused to proceed with their tabuts and proceeded to
attack both Bohras and the police90. The law-enforcement agencies resorted to firing to
clear the streets, resulting in forty-three casualties91.
34 In 1909, the Government of Bombay appointed a Muharram committee to coordinate with
the police in maintaining peace during the festival92. The members of the committee were
mostly drawn from amongst the traditional sources of authority in the various Muslim-
dominated neighbourhoods, as well as men who had attained a position in the world of
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commerce and industry93. Although the festival that year passed off without any violence,
it became apparent that these elites had very little control over those who participated in
the celebrations94. S.M. Edwardes, who assumed charge as police commissioner in that
year,  was  extremely  critical  of  the  government  decision  to  appoint  the  Muharram
committee. The Bombay executive authorities, in his view, ‘had failed to prove that they
are the ultimate masters of the city’. As a result, the street gangs had turned the festival
into ‘an orgy of license, obscenity and disturbance’95. The following year, Edwardes set
about using his special powers to crush the threat posed by the street gangs during the
festival.  He  announced that  although processions  would  be  allowed to  pass  through
Doctor Street, no music whatsoever would be permitted while they were there96. As news
of this decision spread many of the leading neighbourhoods protested by refusing to take
out their tabuts97.  The toli  leaders of these neighbourhoods also sent a petition to the
government accusing Edwardes of being partial to the Bohras98. Although there was no
overt violence, Edwardes’ actions intensified the antagonism between the police and the
Muharram tolis99.
35 The  friction  produced  by  the  actions  of  the  executive  authorities  led  to  an  open
confrontation in 1911. As we have seen, the special powers of the 1902 act allowed the
police  commissioner  to  prescribe  the  routes  for  processions.  Invoking  these  powers,
Edwardes  presented  the  Muharram tolis with  a  precise  processional  route  map  that
precluded them from venturing into Doctor Street and the adjacent Bohra-dominated
localities. Once again, the police commissioner’s decision provoked popular resentment
in  the  Sunnilocalities  and many of  the  neighbourhoods  refused to  apply  for  festival
licenses. His active role in intervening in the conduct of the festival lent further credence
to the popular perception amongst the lower orders that the police commissioner had
been ‘bribed’ by wealthy Bohras100.  But Edwardes’ decision also opened up dissensions
within the various neighbourhoods over the question of applying to the commissioner for
a  festival  license.  The  internal  conflict  between  the  various  Sunni  neighbourhoods
erupted in violence on the penultimate night of the festival, prompting Edwardes to call
in the military. While this dispersed the crowds, it also sparked off a riot on the final
afternoon of the festival as protestors clashed with the police and the military. The troops
resorted to firing, killing twenty persons and injuring scores of others101.
36 In the aftermath of the riot of 1911, Edwardes made out a case for redefining rather than
merely regulating the nature of the Moharram celebrations in the interests of public
order. Specifically, he proposed doing away with the tolis, which were ‘merely an excuse
for rascality to burst its usual barriers and flow over in the city in a current of excessive
turbulence’. To this end, Edwardes invoked his ‘special powers’ and issued a new set of
Muharram regulations in 1912 that prohibited all tolis throughout the festival. The lifting
and circulation of tabuts on the final night of the festival was to be strictly confined to the
limits  of  the  respective  neighbourhoods  in  which  each  tabut was  placed  and  the
appearance  of  any  tabut in  defiance  of  this  rule  was  to  be  considered  ‘an  act  of
disobedience’. As in the previous year, all the Bohra localities were closed off entirely to
all Muharram celebrants throughout the ten days of the festival.  Finally, a deposit of
hundred rupees for good behaviour was now made mandatory for all those who wished to
procure Muharram licenses102.To give effect to these regulations, on the eve of the festival
Edwardes used his powers as a presidency magistrate to remand to judicial custody ‘all
persons known to have been involved in the Muharram disturbances and to be likely to
foment disorder’103. Consequently, an absence of the usual carnival atmosphere and the
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throngs of people on the streets marked the festival of 1912. Most of the mohollas had
decided against building any tabuts as a mark of collective protest as soon as the new
regulations were issued104. ‘Taking it all in all’, Edwardes wrote in a self-congratulatory
vein, ‘the badmash element felt itself outclassed and except in the case of Madanpura…
contented  itself  with  lying  low  and  hurling  threats  and  objurgation  at  the  Police
Commissioner.’ At the same time, he pointed out that the most noteworthy feature was
‘the rise in the number of “Majlis” at which the Maulvis discourse nightly on religious
matters and the very great increase in the number of  Mahomedans attending them’.
‘Religion took the place this year of irreligion’, Edwardes declared, ‘order and tranquillity
reigned in the place of riot’105.
37 The  discretionary  powers  bestowed  by  the  new  act  also  rendered  the  police  an
increasingly obtrusive presence in the quotidian functioning of the proletarian secondary
economy. Of course, the urban poor had been vulnerable to police action even prior to
the passing of the 1902 act106. However, this trend increased dramatically after the new
act strengthened the provisions relating to street offences. The commissioner of police
commented with satisfaction on the fact that the police showed ‘great activity’ in working
the new act, ‘especially with regard to the sections dealing with street nuisance, street
obstruction, and squatter cases’107. Indeed, a majority of the cognizable cases reported by
the  police  commissioner  in  the  annual  police  statistics  in  the  decade  following  the
introduction  of  the  new  act  involved  offences  such  as  ‘street  obstruction’,  ‘public
nuisances’,  gambling,  ‘loitering’  in public thoroughfares and drunken and ‘disorderly’
behaviour.  The  victims  in  the  majority  of  instances  were  petty  hawkers,  cart  men,
prostitutes, beggars and vagrants.
38 The very structural weaknesses of the Bombay police impelled the zealous targetting of
petty street offences. For a numerically challenged, over-worked and poorly-equipped
force, petty street offences involving the poor provided an attractive alternative to the
more strenuous task of chasing up serious crimes against person and property. At the
same time, such petty cases also helped to inflate police crime statistics, an imperative of
no  mean  significance  in  a  bureaucratic  system that  set  great  store  by  numbers.  As
Edwardes acknowledged ‘it has been the practice among Superintendents here, if they
found their number of Local Act cases in their divisions falling below the average to
immediately whip up their subordinates and swamp the Courts with petty cases before
the  end  of  the  year  with  the  sole  object  of  bringing  up  the  figures’108.  Indeed,  a
preponderance  of  petty  cases  in  the  annual  crime  returns  was  frequently  cited  as
evidence of the greater vigilance and vigour of the police109. In turn, the high incidence of
petty street offences also enabled the police to demand more resources to enforce the law
fully. Thus, the police commissioner argued in 1903 that ‘in a large and populous city
there is great scope for Police action in such cases’, and added that ‘the large number of
such cases taken up by the Police is no criterion of what could be done if I had a larger
force to deal with them’110.
39 Equally, however, the pressure asserted by indigenous middle-class ‘public opinion’ was
also  responsible  for  police  action  against  the  casual  economies  of  the  street.  Indian
educated elites became increasingly vocal adherents to the colonial doctrine of ‘public
nuisances’, and favoured strong police action against aspects of proletarian street culture
that  were  deemed  to  be  antithetical  to  the  code  of  ‘respectability’.  Indeed,  local
newspapers frequently brought pressure to bear on the police to suppress activities such
as prostitution and gambling that were ostensibly the innate vices of the lower orders111.
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40 At  the  same time,  the  attempts  of  urban law enforcement  agencies  to  enforce  their
authority over the proletarian public realm, and the resistance of affected sections of the
poor to such intervention,  transformed the street into a site of  conflict  between the
police  and many sections  of  the  urban poor.  Hawkers,  for  instance,  were  constantly
engaged in a running battle with the police. According to the police commissioner, these
‘petty hawkers whose sole possession appears to be a small basket of fruit or vegetables’
when presented before the Magistrate, ‘produce the basket which is about a foot or a foot
and a half in diameter and are consequently treated lightly by the Magistrate who punish
them with  fines  ranging  from two annas  to  a  rupee’112.  In  some instances,  hawkers
arrested by the police ‘produced evidence to show they were sitting just outside the
market and they had paid certain sums to the Municipality for the privilege’,  leaving
magistrates with no option but to acquit them113. As late as 1922, an exasperated Police
Commissioner was complaining that the fines inflicted on hawkers did not prevent them
from paying them and hastening ‘back to their perch to repeat the offence the minute
they get away from Court’. ‘They know fully well’, he added, ‘that the Police cannot spare
men to arrest them everyday and they look on fines as merely rent for the use of the road
which can be easily be paid out of the profits’114. ‘Beggars’ proved to be equally elusive
targets. As we have seen earlier, deportation came to be favoured as a means of ridding
the city of beggars and ‘pauper’ immigrants. In the long run, however, police officials
grew disillusioned with this strategy115.
41 Resistance to the police did not merely take the form of evasion. From time to time, the
poor also assaulted constables patrolling the street. For instance, on 13 January Keroo
Sakharam was  produced at  the  Police  Courts  under  the  charge  of  being  ‘drunk and
disorderly’ in which state he and his friends were said to have attacked Govind Madhu, a
police constable, while the latter was on duty116. In another such incident on the night of
17 May 1905, Mulloo Jiwanji and three of his friends, all South Indian migrants, were
accused of being drunk and assaulting a constable on a public thoroughfare. In convicting
the accused, the magistrate noted that ‘such assaults upon the police were becoming
frequent’117. ‘The police constable is always regarded as a fair quarry by the roughs of the
city’,  rued  Edwardes  in  1910,  ‘and  only  recently  I  have  had  occasion  to  order  the
constables in a certain portion of the E division to patrol in a party of 3 or 4 in order to
avoid ill-treatment and rough usage in the performance of their duties’118.
42 It is not intended to suggest, of course, that the relationship between the police and the
poor came to be defined solely by conflict. It has been argued recently that the lower
ranks of the police force were drawn from the same social base as the working classes of
the city and that both were mutually implicated in relations of reciprocity119. At the same
time, however, the ‘reciprocity’ that ostensibly informed the relationship between the
police and the poor was ultimately based upon an asymmetric power equation. Indeed, it
is for this reason that the ordinary constable was a much-reviled figure on the street and
the city’s police force lacked legitimacy among Bombay’s lower orders.
 
VI. Conclusion
43 The turn of the twentieth century marked a crucial watershed in the history of public
order policing in colonial India. Prior to the 1890s the colonial state had largely focused
on the pacification of the Indian countryside. But as the nineteenth century drew to a
close, it was in the towns of the Raj that the maintenance of ‘public order’ became an
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increasingly  pressing  issue.  This  was  especially  so  in  the  old  Presidency  capitals  of
Calcutta, Madras and Bombay where the dynamics of industrial urbanization began to
generate new problems of social control for the ruling authorities120. In colonial Bombay,
the outbreak of large-scale urban riots during the 1890s as well as the rapid growth of a
proletarian ‘secondary economy’ and culture centred on the street, precipitated a shift in
colonial policing strategies. Most notably, the traditional colonial strategy of ‘indirect’
control  began  to  give  way  to  a  more  intrusive  approach  vis-à-vis the  urban
neighbourhoods and an emergent proletarian public sphere. In particular, this essay has
highlighted the salience of the 1902 police act, which vastly enhanced the discretionary
powers of the police over a range of ‘public’ activities and spaces that had hitherto been
unregulated.  Their  newly  consolidated  powers,  in  turn,  increased  the  scale  and
dimensions of the conflict between the colonial police and the urban poor. Consequently,
the relationship between the colonial administration and the proletarian public realm in
Bombay grew markedly fractious in the years leading up to the Great War.
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RÉSUMÉS
Le tournant du XXe siècle se caractérise par une importante rupture de l’histoire du maintien de
l’ordre public urbain dans l’Inde britannique. Cet article, consacré à la Bombay de la fin du siècle,
décrit cette importante évolution des stratégies policières coloniales, précipitée par l’anxiété que
suscitaient l’urbanisation et l’industrialisation rapides ainsi que l’arrivée massive de travailleurs.
Il  éclaire  en particulier  le  sens d’une nouvelle  loi,  promulguée en 1902,  et  qui  accroissait  et
renforçait  énormément  les  pouvoirs  de  police  pour  tout  un ensemble  de  lieux  et  d’activités
relevant d’une «sphère publique prolétarienne» émergente. Le pouvoir discrétionnaire étendu
que la nouvelle loi conférait à la police eut, selon nous, pour effet d’amplifier les frictions entre la
police et les habitants pauvres des villes dans les années précédant la Première Guerre mondiale.
The turn of the twentieth century marked an important watershed in the history of urban ‘public
order’ policing in British India. This essay focuses on fin-de-siècle Bombay and describes how the
anxieties provoked by rapid industrial urbanization and massive labour migration precipitated
an important shift in colonial policing strategies. In particular, it highlights the significance of a
new act, introduced in 1902 that vastly enhanced and consolidated the authority of the police
over a range of sites and activities within an emergent ‘proletarian public sphere’.  The wide
discretionary powers vested in the police by the new act, it is argued, amplified the scale and
dimensions of the potential friction between the police and the urban poor in the years leading
up to the First World War.
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